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Cargo theft. Most of you have probably never heard of the term. It
should come as no surprise that the offense is commonly referred to as the
silent crime.' It is silent because people rarely see it. As a property crime, it
feels less personal and it is insured. When it does rear its ugly head and make
a headline, it is usually an attention-grabbing headline based on the items
targeted and the startling amount stolen. These headlines are more than likely
about pharmaceuticals. A pharmaceutical theft can cause alarm when the sto-
len product has been stored in a manner that corrupts the integrity of the
product, making it potentially harmful, or even lethal to a patient who is
prescribed the drug that re-enters the supply chain after being stored improp-
erly.2 This has happened and has resulted in multiple deaths.3
II. THE SLENT CRIME
Measuring the impact of this crime is a challenge. Law enforcement
officers indicate that many cargo thefts go unreported.4 Some suggest that as
many as five thefts go unreported for every one cargo theft that is reported.5
Many companies choose not to suffer from bad publicity associated with
reporting these thefts since the likelihood of a successful recovery is so
slight.6 They may believe insurance will cover the damages more efficiently
and with less overhead than a lawsuit or a public statement.7 From a dollar
value standpoint, the level and extent of this crime is highly speculative.
Even recoveries can be a challenge to law enforcement as many com-
modities are not tagged with unique identifiers to prove definitively the prod-
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uct was indeed stolen.8 In cases where a criminal is caught with suspect
goods in his possession, law enforcement officials sometimes struggle to
prove a crime has been committed.9 Additionally, the suspects could be eligi-
ble for immediate bail because the penalties for property crime are light.1o
This is why cargo theft is aptly named the silent crime and is considered a
major growth industry by criminal organizations."1
III. RISK VS. REWARD
All of these factors combined create a rare opportunity seldom encoun-
tered by the criminal underworld, one of both low risk and high reward.
Traditional bank robberies result in an average net profit $5,00012 and are
virtually guaranteed a robust law enforcement response.1 3 The average cargo
thief, in contrast, could resell stolen cargo at approximately ten cents on the
dollar.14 For a million-dollar load, that is not a bad reward as a result of only
a few hours of work. If the thief is caught, odds are she will be released and
can be back at the same gig in another state within hours.15
Stereotypes indicating that criminals are of less than average intelli-
gence could not be further from the truth. Risk and reward considerations
come naturally to them, and they rarely pass up lucrative opportunities pro-
vided by dynamic, just-in-time supply chains. The unique combination of
free-flowing goods and supply chains that stop those goods from moving at
several vulnerable junctures provide the criminal the opportunity to steal
many millions of dollars' worth of highly sought-after goods.16
This begs the question: How does a criminal know what's in one trailer
versus another? The gangs that trade in this space are usually multi-dimen-
8. Id.
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bank-as-told-by-an-actual-bank-robber-1710663924.
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15. See Zambito, supra note 9.
16. See Sean Kilcarr & Jim Mele, Increase in Cargo Theft Has Caught Law En-




sional.17 At the center of this web operates an individual usually referred to
as the broker.1 8 He is the mastermind behind the operation and could have
several loosely aligned gangs operating at his direction.1 9 In many cases the
Full Truck Load (FTL) is targeted directly for the product it contains-essen-
tially theft-to-order.20 The broker takes the order, or based on research,
figures out what stolen product has the higher Return on Investment (ROI).21
Pharmaceuticals neatly fit into this space, particularly when the media high-
lights a current drug shortage and its negative impact on the public.22 Gangs
will then study all available media resources to gather information on where
that product is manufactured and warehoused.23 Once the distribution profile
is understood, the gang will dispatch to the area.24 One of the most successful
collection of gangs who operate in this space come from the Hialeah suburb
of Miami.25 These gangs, when directed to travel to locations such as Dallas,
Texas, or Los Angeles, California, fly with low-cost airlines, rent vehicles
locally, and establish monitoring sites overlooking the FTL exit gates at dis-
tribution centers they know store the drugs or other goods they are directed to
steal.26 With pharmaceuticals, they know the usual truck profile for an expen-
sive, high-value product almost always involves a temperature-controlled en-
vironment.27 Therefore, they know a reefer is required and also look for a
trailer with a security lock and seal. 28 They assume, again based on experi-
ence, the company may even have some form of covert satellite tracking
device accompanying the load. 29 Critically, and probably most importantly,
17. See BURGES, supra note 1, at 45-46.
18. See id. at 57-58.
19. See id. at 45, 48, 58.
20. See id. at 8.
21. See id. at 7-8, 58 (discussing the broker's process of analyzing the industry,
determining the best product to steal, and choosing a selling price for the cargo
after its theft).
22. See id. at 124.
23. See Burgess, supra note 1, at 8.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 48.
26. See id. at 52-53.
27. See Jean-Paul Rodrigue & Theo Notteboom, The Cold Chain and its Logistics,
THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS (2017), https://people.hofstra.edu/
geotrans/eng/ch5en/appl5en/ch5a5en.html.
28. See id.; Model Guidance for the Storage and Transport of Time- and Tempera-
ture-Sensitive Pharmaceutical Products, World Health Organization Expert
Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations, World Health
Organization Technical Report Series NO. 961, Forty-Fifth Report, at 348.
29. See BURGES, supra note 1, at 211-12.
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they know one thing: drivers are creatures of habit that stop to fuel and rest in
the same place-allowing cargo thieves to hijack trucks with little or no in-
terference from the drivers.30 This results in a significant amount of North
American FTL cargo theft being a relatively simple affair.
FTL drivers have a difficult job, and it's only becoming more difficult.
A rash of new government regulations around mandated driving hours3l and
Electronic Logging Devices32 means drivers must carefully plan how and
when they can legally drive their trucks. This was a paper-based problem
before that involved the driver stopping near their pick-up locations to do
their administrative work, to fuel up, and to eat prior to beginning their long
journey to a destination. Most stops made by the driver usually occur within
a 200-mile radius of the pick-up location.33 Aware of this fact, criminal gangs
will follow the driver until he stops.34 It costs a driver money to shut his
diesel engine down at a truck stop, meaning most drivers leave their trucks
on idle once they leave their vehicle.35 Also, almost all trucks are not
equipped with an electronic alarm system. This creates a condition where a
driver leaves a truck trailer, containing many millions of dollars' worth of
cargo, running and unattended the entire time he needs to eat, shower, and
complete his required administrative duties. This could take a driver over an
hour. It takes a gang less than a minute to enter a locked vehicle and drive
away with it.36 One member of the gang will have experience driving a com-
mercial vehicle and may even be licensed.
As the thief drives away, another two gang members will have followed
the driver into the truck stop to alert the gang if the driver changes his mind
and returns to the vehicle. Another gang member in their vehicle will monitor
the local law enforcement radio bands if a 911 call is raised. Once the truck
is clear, all members will return to the gang vehicle and depart the scene.
They will have a previously agreed rendezvous point approximately 10-15
miles away. They favor locations where truck parking is normal, such as
Walmart. The gang will park the stolen tractor-trailer and place surveillance
to confirm no utilization of covert tracking. Recently, gangs have opted for
jamming devices, which they carry in their vehicle, as a more efficient
30. 1 ANDREw R. THOMAS, SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
AND INNOVATIONS IN MOVING GOODS SAFELY AND EFFICIENTLY 13 (2010).
31. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 395.3 (2016).
32. Id. § 31137.
33. Keeping Your Cargo Safe, SCHNEIDER, https://schneider.com/document/keep
ing-your-cargo-safe-pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
34. See THOMAS, supra note 30, at 13.
35. GORDON J. KNAPP, IS OVER THE ROAD TRUCKING FOR YOU? 115-16 (2d ed.
2011).
36. See Karen E. Thuermer, Cargo Theft is a Critical Issue to Food and Beverage




counter-measure to jamming technology. 37 Once sure of the secured trailer,
they will bring in a clean tractor-trailer and exchange it for the stolen one.
In many instances, it has been proven that thieves have established elab-
orate "reverse logistics" operations for the safe warehousing of the stolen
goods until the buyer can receive them. 38 But, this is not always the case:
after several of the gang members were arrested, the stolen trailers were re-
turned to South Florida, thus establishing a new criminal operation. The
thieves contracted a legitimate hauling company to collect the load from a
warehouse leased by the thieves and, then, carried to a delivery location in
Miami. Although more expensive, this presents less risk to the gang
members.
Another factor that plays into this dynamic is the industry's ability to
fuel the problem by buying commodities wholesale, particularly when
shortages are experienced.39 For example, some wholesale distributors of
pharmaceuticals and electronics have purchased their own stolen commodi-
ties from the very organization that that stole them.40 This seems crazy, but it
ties back to the challenge of identifying stolen products in the first place.
How can all this happen as simply as the above demonstrates? Why
can't law enforcement put a stop to this? Why aren't the laws tougher? All
good questions, but the silent crime as an issue is not going away anytime
soon. It is just too lucrative with too many opportunities out there, and the
problem will be exacerbated by the difficulty of tracking and quantifying the
level and extent of the problem due to the international and transcontinental
nature of commerce and the movement of goods across state lines and over-
seas. While trade moves freely, law enforcement's ability to move as freely
and thus follow closely is hampered by jurisdiction and limited budgets.41
The FBI, the one U.S.-based agency with jurisdiction to cross state lines and
conduct multi-state investigations, has a limited budget to direct towards
cargo theft and the gangs who perpetrate it.42 All federal eyes are turned
towards terrorism, with little time or money dedicated to the silent crime.
37. Walt Beadling, 10 Takeaways from the GPS Cargo Tracking/Monitoring Fo-
rum, CARGO SECURITY ALLIANCE (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.securecargo.org/
sites/securecargo.org/files/10_takeawaysfrom-the-gpsscargo-trackingjforum
rx-360_and_pcsc_0.pdf.
38. Karen Hawks, What is Reverse Logistics, REVERSE LOGISTICS MAG. (Winter/
Spring 2006), http://www.rlmagazine.comleditionOlpl2.php; Sean Kilcarr,
Cargo Theft Now a Tougher Nut to Crack, FLEETOWNER (Jun. 1, 2016), http:/
fleetowner.com/fleet-management/cargo-theft-now-tougher-nut-crack.
39. See BURGES, supra note 1, at 64-65.
40. Id.
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IV. CARGO THEFT TARGET LOCATIONS
America's cargo theft problem seems tame when compared to that of
Brazil or Mexico.43 Only in very rare circumstances is hijacking a Modus
Operandi used by U.S.-based cargo thieves.44 The number one cardinal rule
practiced is do not elevate the crime from property to people. If you do, law
enforcement will investigate and pursue you. There have been many inci-
dents when a theft-oriented gang discovered a driver sleeping in the bunk as
they drove away. 45 The ideal reaction is to stop and flee. You don't want to
hurt people and provoke a more robust response. The exact opposite is the
norm in countries that have hardened the areas of theft risk such as truck
stops and delivery yards. In countries like Brazil and Mexico, the criminal
gangs will choose the location for the theft.46 These locations are usually
where the FTL has no option but to slow down and stop. Toll booths, traffic
lights, and congested traffic areas are commonly targeted locations.47 When
that won't do, blocking vehicles such as dump trucks are used to slow and
stop the targeted vehicle.48 If the vehicle is escorted by security contractors, a
common practice overseas, additional vehicles are used by the gangs to seize
the security officers alongside the drivers.49 If the escort is armed, the gangs
will shoot the protection officers or use coercion methods such as family
pictures to encourage the guards and drivers to surrender willingly.50 Other
elaborate methods are also common. If covert tracking is practiced, suspected
tunnels have been dug to house multiple FTL's below ground to kill the
tracking signal.51
43. FreightWatch International Global Threat Assessment, FREIGHTWATCH INTER-
NATIONAL (Feb. 10, 2010), https://www.securecargo.org/sites/securecargo.org/
files/FreightWatch_2010_GlobalThreatAssessment.pdf.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Cindy Clayton, Truck Cab Stolen, Driver Abducted in Newport News, VIRGIN-
IAN-TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/truck-cab-
stolen-driver-abducted-in-newport-news/articlea4f6ac92-e672-5645-8ae2-08
2027a73875.html.
46. See FreightWatch International Global Threat Assessment, supra note 43, at
17.
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id. at 22, 42, 45.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Truck Hijackings, Crime and Road Safety, ARRIVE ALIVE, https://www.arrivea
live.co.za/Truck-Hijackings-Crime-and-Road-Safety (last visited Mar. 19,
2017).
51. Tristan, Signal-Minded Approach to Signal Jamming, TRANSPORT WORLD AF-




Perhaps the most troubling circumstance is the unfortunate fact that law
enforcement has been complicit in several confirmed theft events in overseas
jurisdictions.5 2 Having no dependable law enforcement response capability
severely complicates corporate security management of this phenomena and
can make the cost of prevention unsustainable.53 In most of these countries
there are several different law enforcement agencies with a confusing cross-
functional jurisdiction.54 While this confusion can be a problem, it can also
assist if you have some idea on which agency was involved and which
agency was not.55 Having intelligence at this level is a challenge, as the dy-
namic environment means it is a constantly shifting target.56 When circum-
stances like this exist many private security agencies have a policy that
entails immediately calling out all law enforcement agencies in the hope that
one will counter the other.57 This practice has led to some embarrassing sce-
narios where law enforcement has engaged with other brother agencies.58
V. IN-TRANSIT SECURITY PLANS
So, what do you do when cargo theft occurs? Freight must flow and it
must flow seamlessly.59 If your in-transit security plan in any way slows or
negatively impacts the smooth freight flow, it is doomed to fail.60 Doubling
your transportation costs by implementing costly security counter-measures
is not sustainable.61 Here's how the normal scenario normally plays out: the
shipper gets a phone call from his transportation vendor saying a truckload is
missing, and the shipper responds, "What do you mean missing? Is the driver
asleep? Has his cell phone run out of juice? Will he be found again?" The
transportation vendor then responds, "No. The load has been stolen."62 Typi-
cally, this is the "hair on fire" stage; frantic efforts are made to try to under-
stand what has happened and how do we prevent it from happening again.
Afterwards, money is thrown at the problem and new high security standards
52. See FreightWatch International Global Threat Assessment, supra note 43, at
22.
53. BURGES, supra note 1, at 11-12.
54. Bill Turner, Cargo Theft: Not Just a US Problem, LPM INSIDER (Mar. 24,
2016), http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/supply-chain-security/cargo-
theft-not-just-a-us-problem/.
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61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
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are implemented.63 Therefore, the problem should be contained. Fast forward
a year, and a P&L holder will ask how we can reduce the transportation
spending.64 The P&L holder might ask, "Why do we have so many security
provisions when we haven't lost a truck in over a year?" You get the point.
There are in-transit security plans that are sustainable and can last the
test of time. Build a plan that is based on knowledge.65 Know your supply
chain completely as well as all the vendors who participate.66 That sounds
simpler than it is, but make the effort to identify and document the key ven-
dors and ask them if they are aware of the relevant risky scenarios. Essen-
tially, confirm that vendors have a plan and know how to respond if they find
themselves in such a scenario. Your plan should focus on prevention and not
just response.67
As Benjamin Franklin once put it, "An ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure." This is especially true in the supply chain where identifying
weaknesses that could be exploited by various criminal players across a mul-
titude of service providers is crucial to any successful theft prevention plan.68
Most importantly, your plan must include any key player who may control
the risk scenario based on his or her actions. In North America, this key
player is the driver.69 Often, millions of dollars are spent securing facilities,
production lines, and warehouse distribution centers. 70 Yet, when a payload
that is worth millions of dollars is loaded into a cargo trailer, it is released
63. Id. at 160.
64. Profit and Loss Statement (P&L), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/p/plstatement.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) ("A profit and loss state-
ment (P&L) is a financial statement that summarizes the revenues, costs, and
expenses incurred during a specific period of time, usually a fiscal quarter or
year.").
65. See Bill Zalud, The Daily Challenges of Supply Chain Security, SECURITY
MAG. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/87010-the-
daily-challenges-of-supply-chain-security.




68. See Michelle Curtis, Preventing Cargo Theft, RECON LOGISTIcs (July 22,
2014), http://reconlogistics.com/preventing-cargo-theft.
69. See Cargo Theft Risk Dependent on Where Truck Drivers Park, PENSKE (Jan.
13, 2016), https://blog.gopenske.com/insights/cargo-theft-risk-dependent-on-
where-truck-drivers-park/.
70. See generally Industrial & Warehouse Security: Put a Stop to Theft and Pilfer-
age, Cisco-EAGLE, http://www.cisco-eagle.com/uploads/White-Papers/eBook-
LossPrevention-tall.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (describing the broad




with little or no security protection.7' It is the hub and spoke argument: we
can protect the few, but not the many. At least that used to be the case. 72
Transportation is evolving from a fragmented and disconnected state into a
seamless environment from origin to destination.73 There is demand to have
immediate access to information related to cargo content, location, and esti-
mated time of arrival-all of which are readily available data points.74 Con-
necting these dots is now considered a relatively basic challenge in the
mobile-connected world.75
VI. THE DRIVER
In the fragmented state of the North American logistics system, the sin-
gle profound pain point is the condition experienced by the FTL long-haul
driver today. The driver is without a doubt the most important cog in the
machine that moves America's economy.76 They directly influence the risk
environment and can be the deciding factor on whether it is a good or bad
day.77 They directly affect the care and handling of the product for a signifi-
cant portion of the distribution process and are relied on to make that all
critical on-time delivery (OTD).78 Yet, in almost all cases, they are elimi-
nated from almost all risk management plans.79 They are relegated from all
security plans that are based on what to do when the driver messes up and
loses the load. In general, they are usually the individuals who are treated
poorly and forgotten about in the economic spread. Drivers deserve a second
71. See, e.g., Sample Transportation Security Plan, FAR W. AGRIBUSINESs AsS'N,
http://www.fwaa.org/accounts/fwaaldata-documents/63/files/plan.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2017).
72. See Justine Brown, Locking Down Supply Chain Security, INBOUND LOGISTICS
(Jan. 2013), http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/articlellocking-down-supply
-chain-security/.
73. See Zalud, supra note 65.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See generally Disruptions Ahead, CSX (2016), http://www.supplychain
247.com/paper/your-guide-to-upcoming-trucking-regulations/papers#register
(describing the general importance of drivers in a functioning supply chain
through the lens of new trucking regulations).
77. See Schneider, Keeping Your Cargo Safe, 3 (2016), https://schneider.com/cs/
schneider/document/keeping-your-cargo-safe-pdf.
78. See Supply Chain Gain: Trucking Tactics, INBOUND LOGISTICS (Jan. 2011),
http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/supply-chain-gain-trucking-tac-
tics/.
79. See, e.g., Amber Road, Heightening Supply Chain Security: The New Para-
digm and Best Practices to Manage Security, SUPPLY CHAIN 24/7 (May 4,
2016), http://www.supplychain247.com/paper/heightening-supply-chain-
se curity/amberjroad (mentioning the driver only once in only one instance).
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look, and most importantly they deserve to be treated with the respect hard-
working professionals deserve. They are the security professional's dream-
hard-working, responsible, and honest. Drivers have a significant amount of
skin in the game when you factor in they own their vehicle and trailer, and
their livelihood is at risk if they lose the load. If corporate security could
figure out a way to positively involve the driver, a scalable low-cost security
program is not only possible, but could have a greater chance of success.
VII. ONE FINAL POINT ON THE DRIVER SHORTAGE
The American Trucking Association (ATA) predicts in the next ten
years, 890,000 drivers are needed to maintain the pace of industry growth as
well as replace retirees.o The current deficit of 48,000 FTL drivers will
climb to around 160,000 in the next five years. 81 Drivers are not retiring
because they can. They are retiring because they are struggling to make a
living. Despite rising pay rates, transportation-lending practices are worsen-
ing the payday lending schemes.82 The driver's inability to make a living
means this issue will become a crisis and will not just affect rates, but may
impact a shipper's ability to move his product if not systemically addressed
by the entire industry.
80. Bob Costello & Rod Suarez, Truck Driver Shortage Analysis 2015, AM.
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